Thailand helps feed the world, but Thailand does not secure enough of the molecule that helps feed Thailand.

Chanon Pornrungroj | July 2026

During the Frontier Champions programme supported by the Royal Academy of Engineering last year, I spent a lot of time speaking with policymakers, industrial partners and technology providers about Thailand’s energy future. We discussed solar power, hydrogen, data centres, green fuels and how Thailand could position itself in the global energy transition. But what struck me most was not only what we discussed, it was what we did not discuss enough.

We often talk about energy security. We talk about electricity prices, natural gas, solar farms and batteries. But for a country that calls itself the “Kitchen of the World”, we rarely talk about fertiliser security with the same seriousness. This is surprising because fertiliser is not just an agricultural input. It is a strategic chemical supply chain. At the centre of that supply chain is ammonia.

Thailand is often described as the “Kitchen of the World”. The phrase is not just branding. In 2024, Thailand exported about US$52.2 billion of agricultural and agro-industrial products, equivalent to roughly 10% of national GDP. Agriculture, forestry and fishing directly contributed about 8.7% of GDP before accounting for food processing, logistics, cold chains and export services. By most measures, Thailand has earned the title.

But there is a vulnerability hidden underneath this success.

Thailand helps feed the world, but Thailand does not secure enough of the molecule that helps feed Thailand.

That molecule is ammonia, NH₃

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The nitrogen problem

Every crop in Thailand - every grain of jasmine rice, every tonne of sugarcane, every kilogram of rubber, every durian shipment - depends on nitrogen fertiliser. Ammonia is the starting point of modern nitrogen fertiliser. It is made by reacting nitrogen from air with hydrogen in one of the most consequential chemical processes in human history. Without the Haber-Bosch process, roughly half of today's global population could not be fed.

The reaction is simple on paper:

N2 + 3H2 -> 2NH3

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In industry, however, this simple equation requires high temperature, high pressure and carefully engineered catalysts. Modern Haber-Bosch plants typically operate at about 150-300 bar and 400-500 °C. Most existing ammonia plants use hydrogen made from natural gas through steam methane reforming (SMR: CH4 + H2O → CO + 3H2). Ammonia can then be converted to urea by reacting it with CO2. Urea, ammonium sulfate, DAP and other nitrogen fertilisers underpin Thailand's rice, sugarcane, cassava, rubber, oil palm, maize, fruit and vegetable production.

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Thailand does not have a large-scale domestic Haber-Bosch ammonia and urea production base. Instead, the country sits mainly at the downstream end of the fertiliser chain: importing fertiliser raw materials and finished products, then blending and distributing them to farmers. Krungsri Research reports that Thailand's fertiliser demand reached about 5.5 million tonnes in 2024, while imports reached 6.2 million tonnes worth THB 91 billion. Nitrogen fertilisers accounted for about half of imported base fertilisers.

This is not only an economic issue. It is a food-security issue.

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When fertiliser prices rise, farmers face higher production costs. When supply chains are disrupted by war, energy-price shocks, shipping bottlenecks or export restrictions, countries without domestic nitrogen-fertiliser production become exposed. The 2026 disruption around the Strait of Hormuz made this risk visible: the corridor is important for global fertiliser, sulphur, LNG and oil trade, and Thailand responded with fertiliser-stabilisation measures as concerns grew over imported supply and prices.

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The regional contrast

The comparison with regional peers makes this vulnerability more striking.

India is still an importer of some fertilisers, but it has a large domestic urea industry. In 2023-24, India's domestic urea production exceeded 31.4 million tonnes, and six new urea plants added 7.62 million tonnes of annual capacity. Vietnam has also built a domestic urea base. Its four domestic urea plants - Ca Mau, Phu My, Ninh Binh and Ha Bac - have a combined capacity of about 2.6-3.0 million tonnes per year, while domestic demand is only about 1.6-1.8 million tonnes per year. Vietnam therefore has a structural urea surplus.

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Thailand, by contrast, is a larger agri-food exporter than Vietnam but remains structurally dependent on imported nitrogen fertilisers. Based on public production and plant information, Thailand and Cambodia are among the clearest mainland Southeast Asian examples of net food-exporting economies without meaningful domestic Haber-Bosch ammonia production. Thailand is the more strategically exposed case because of the scale and sophistication of its agricultural and industrial economy.

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This is the paradox: Thailand is a major food exporter, but not a major producer of the nitrogen molecules that support food production.

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A platform molecule with three layers

The case for a Thai ammonia strategy is not limited to fertiliser security. Ammonia should be treated as a platform molecule with three reinforcing roles.

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• Fertiliser security. A domestic ammonia-to-urea platform would not eliminate all fertiliser imports, but it would create a strategic buffer for the most critical nitrogen fertilisers. Map Ta Phut and the Rayong industrial corridor are logical candidates to evaluate because they already have petrochemical infrastructure, port access, natural-gas handling, industrial utilities and chemical-engineering expertise.

• Hydrogen carrier. Hydrogen is difficult to transport because it has low volumetric energy density and normally requires compression or liquefaction. Ammonia offers another route. It contains about 17.6 wt% hydrogen and can be liquefied at around 9-10 bar at room temperature or at -33 °C at atmospheric pressure. Global ammonia shipping and storage infrastructure already exists through the fertiliser industry.

• Dispatchable low-carbon fuel. Ammonia can be used as a fuel or cracked back to hydrogen, but it is not automatically clean in every application. Safe use requires control of toxicity, leakage, NOx emissions and combustion or cracking efficiency. If produced from low-carbon hydrogen and used with appropriate emissions control, ammonia can become part of a firm, molecule-based energy system for sectors that need reliable 24-hour operation, including industry, shipping and potentially data centres.

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Start with grey or blue. Switch to green when ready.

The Haber-Bosch process today runs mainly on grey hydrogen from fossil fuels. Green ammonia is chemically identical but uses hydrogen from water electrolysis powered by renewable electricity. The synthesis loop remains broadly the same; the major change is the hydrogen source. In practice, however, green-H2 integration also requires compression, purification, storage and operational buffering because Haber-Bosch plants prefer stable feed and load conditions, while solar and wind are variable.

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There is another route that Thailand should not ignore: biogas.

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Thailand has large biogas potential from industrial wastewater, livestock waste, landfill gas, organic food waste and energy crops. Data presented by Biogas TH estimate a total biogas potential of roughly 6,900 ktoe, with the largest contributions from energy crops at about 4,115 ktoe, industrial wastewater at about 1,235 ktoe, landfill at about 592 ktoe and livestock at about 428 ktoe. This is not a small resource. It is a domestic methane resource that Thailand already knows how to produce, collect and use.

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This matters for ammonia because most conventional ammonia plants already begin with methane. Today, that methane normally comes from natural gas or imported LNG. In Thailand’s case, part of that fossil methane could be replaced with upgraded biogas, or biomethane, after removing impurities such as H₂S, moisture and siloxanes. The biomethane can then be reformed into hydrogen before entering the Haber Bosch loop. 

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This creates a practical bridge between grey ammonia and green ammonia. Solar-powered electrolysis is important for the long-term future, but biogas offers a nearer-term domestic carbon-based route. It can reduce reliance on LNG imports, use Thailand’s agricultural and industrial waste streams more productively, and turn local biomass residues into a strategic input for fertiliser production.

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Biogas also has an additional advantage: it naturally contains CO₂. In a conventional ammonia-to-urea chain, ammonia reacts with CO₂ to produce urea. If properly captured and purified, the biogenic CO₂ from biogas upgrading or reforming could become part of the urea production route. In other words, Thailand’s waste streams could support both sides of the fertiliser molecule: renewable hydrogen from biomethane and biogenic carbon dioxide for urea synthesis.

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This would make ammonia not only a green-hydrogen story, but also a bioeconomy story. Thailand’s farms, food factories, livestock sector and wastewater streams could become part of the same national platform: producing domestic fertiliser, reducing imported LNG dependence and creating lower-carbon fuels from resources already available inside the country.

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This distinction matters. Thailand does not need to wait for green hydrogen to be fully cost-competitive before thinking strategically about ammonia. It can build industrial capability, safety regulation, port handling, storage, engineering skills and downstream urea integration first, while green hydrogen and renewable-ammonia systems mature in parallel.

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Thailand also has a strong technical case for long-term green ammonia. The country has sunlight, flat land, water access, ports, an existing chemical industry and large domestic agricultural demand. A simple thought experiment illustrates the scale. Thailand's land area is about 511,000 km2. If 5% of that land were hypothetically developed for solar PV - about 25,500 km2 - at a utility-scale density of 40 MW/km2 and a 17% capacity factor, this area could host about 1,020 GW of solar capacity and generate roughly 1,500 TWh of electricity per year. At 55 kWh per kg H2 for water electrolysis, this corresponds to a theoretical hydrogen production potential of about 27-28 million tonnes per year, enough for domestic use and export.

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This is not a land-use proposal. It is a scale check. Five percent of national land area would be enormous and would raise serious questions over land competition, grid connection, water management, finance, intermittency, electrolyser cost and community acceptance. But the calculation shows one important point: Thailand's constraint is not the absence of nitrogen, sunlight or engineering talent. The constraint is strategic coordination.

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Start now, but design for transition

There is a version of this conversation that gets stuck on cost and carbon. Green hydrogen remains more expensive than grey hydrogen in most markets. Electrolysers are scaling, but project economics are still difficult. Therefore, the argument goes, Thailand should wait.

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That framing is too passive. A more practical strategy is to separate two questions: first, how Thailand secures nitrogen fertiliser; second, how Thailand decarbonises that nitrogen over time.

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A Haber-Bosch facility supplied initially by natural-gas-based hydrogen could reduce Thailand's strategic exposure to imported nitrogen fertilisers. If paired with carbon capture, it could move toward blue ammonia. Over time, as low-carbon hydrogen becomes cheaper and more available, green hydrogen can be blended into or substituted for the hydrogen feed. This does not mean the transition is automatic: the plant must be designed with future feedstock flexibility, storage, grid connection and hydrogen quality in mind. But it does mean that ammonia infrastructure can be built as a transition-ready asset rather than a permanent fossil lock-in.

The impact should also be stated carefully. A domestic plant would not make Thailand fully independent from all fertiliser imports, nor would it remove all exposure to global gas, sulphur, phosphate or potash markets. But it would materially reduce the most important vulnerability: dependence on imported nitrogen molecules for a food-exporting economy.

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The N, P, K picture: two out of three is not enough

Plant nutrition requires three elements above all others: nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K).

For potassium, Thailand has significant potash resources in the Khorat Plateau, but development remains sensitive because of salinisation risks, environmental concerns and community opposition. Any potash strategy must therefore be technically rigorous and socially careful.

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For phosphorus, Thailand has no comparable domestic resource base. Phosphate rock is geographically concentrated globally, making phosphate fertilisers a continuing strategic import risk.

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For nitrogen, the situation is different. Unlike phosphorus and potassium, which depend on finite geological deposits, nitrogen is in the air: about 78% of the atmosphere is N2. The Haber-Bosch process is the industrial key that unlocks it. Nitrogen is the one fertiliser pillar where Thailand is not fundamentally constrained by geology, only by policy, investment and execution.

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What this means

Thailand should treat ammonia not as an old fertiliser chemical, but as a national platform molecule with four simultaneous functions:

• For food security: domestic nitrogen fertiliser and protection against global supply shocks.

• For energy security: a storable hydrogen carrier and possible low-carbon fuel for reliable long-duration operation.

• For industrial strategy: a bridge between Thailand's petrochemical base, renewable-energy potential, agricultural demand and future green-fuel export markets.

• For climate policy: a pathway to decarbonise one of the world's most important and emissions-intensive chemical supply chains.

The 2026 Hormuz disruption showed how fragile fertiliser supply chains can become when geopolitics, energy and food systems collide. Emergency fertiliser measures can soften the shock, but they do not solve the structural problem. The longer-term answer is domestic ammonia capability - ideally transition-ready, and eventually green - so that the same infrastructure supports food security, energy security and decarbonisation.

The technical case is strong. The resource base is there. What is missing is a national decision to stop treating ammonia as someone else's molecule. For Thailand, ammonia is not just a climate story. It is a food-security story, an energy-security story and a missed industrial opportunity that grows larger every year we delay.

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"The Kitchen of the World deserves its own pantry."

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1. Thailand agricultural export value: Thailand PRD / MOAC reported Thailand's 2024 agricultural and agro-industrial exports at about US$52.2 billion; VietnamPlus reported the same TPSO figure.

2. GDP and agriculture share: World Bank, GDP (current US$), Thailand, 2024; World Bank, agriculture, forestry and fishing value added (% of GDP), Thailand, 2024.

3. Population supported by Haber-Bosch: Erisman, J. W. et al. How a century of ammonia synthesis changed the world. Nature Geoscience 1, 636-639 (2008).

4. Haber-Bosch conditions: Cheema and Krewer, Operating envelope of Haber-Bosch process design for power-to-ammonia, RSC/PMC; and industrial references reporting typical 150-300 bar and 400-500 °C operation.

5. Thailand fertiliser demand/imports: Krungsri Research, Industry Outlook 2026-2028: Chemical Fertilizer, reporting 2024 demand of 5.5 Mt and imports of 6.2 Mt worth THB 91 billion.

6. Hormuz/fertiliser disruption: IFPRI blog on 2026 Iran war impacts on global fertiliser markets; Reuters and Thai government/Nation reporting on fertiliser shipments and Thailand's fertiliser measures.

7. India urea context: Government of India / PIB, 2023-24 domestic urea production exceeding 314 lakh metric tonnes and six new urea plants adding 76.2 lakh metric tonnes capacity.

8. Vietnam urea context: ASEM Connect Vietnam / Vietnam MARD reporting domestic urea demand of 1.6-1.8 Mt/y and domestic capacity of about 3 Mt/y.

9. Ammonia as hydrogen carrier: U.S. DOE white paper, Potential Roles of Ammonia in a Hydrogen Economy, reporting 17.65 wt% hydrogen and ammonia vapor pressure of about 9.2 bar at room temperature.

10. Green hydrogen costs and uncertainty: IEA Global Hydrogen Review and Reuters reporting on IEA's 2024/2025 hydrogen outlooks; IRENA, Green Hydrogen Cost Reduction, 2020.

11. PV-to-H2 scale calculation: author's back-of-the-envelope calculation using 511,000 km2 land area, 5% land, 40 MW/km2 PV density, 17% capacity factor and 55 kWh/kg H2 electrolysis electricity input.